Derrida+(BB)

"[...] **the import of context can never be dissociated from the analysis of a text, and that despite or because of this context is always transofrmative-transofrmable, exportative-exportable** [...]" (p. 79)

On the themes of 'true', 'wrong', and 'false' imposed on Sec by Searle, and the expression of 'misreading':

'More than simply a **misreading**,' **an expression of which I am particularly fond**, would be a better description of //Sec//, on the condition, however -- but isn't this always possible? and this is precisely my question -- that it is made into a misreading of sorts, or into 'more than simply a misreading' with regard to what can be presumed to be the true intention of Sarl. Can one deny what I have just said in 2? How is it possible to miss the point that //Sec//, from one end to the other, is concerned with the question of truth, with the system of values associated with it, repeating //and// altering that system, dividing and displacing it in accordance with the logical force of the //iter//, which 'ties repetition to alterity' (Sec, p. 7) (p. 43-4)
 * 1) "Saying something apparently 'false' (the economical and limited hypothesis of Sarl, designed to incorporate the thing), or something dubious, but presenting it in a manner, form, and shape which (full of traps and parasitical in nature) would increase the chances of the debate getting started; and rendering it inevitable that the auto-authorized descendants of 'prominent' philosophical traditions could not but reply, would be obliged to reply (a case anticipated by Austin), even if they did not; or, growing angry, would say whatever came to mind, or else very determinate things which would then set the stage for the confrontation they would have always hoped 'never quite takes place.' Or else,
 * 2) "Proposing a text as is again here the case, a writing and signatures, whose //performance// (structure, event, context, etc.) defines at every moment the oppositions of concepts or of values, the rigor of those oppositional limits that speech act theory endorses by virtue of its very axiomatics; offering the performance of a text which, by raising in passing the question of truth (beyond Austin's intermittent impulses in this direction) does not //simply// succumb to its jurisdiction and remains, at this point, qua textual performance, irreducible to 'verdictive' (as Austin might say) sentences of the type: this is true, this is false, 'completely mistaken' or 'obviously false.'

The remainder and translation:

"Jeffrey Mehlmann and Sam Weber, for their part, did well to translate //restance// by //remainder// and not by permanence. I cannot say whether or not //remainder//, by itself, adequately translates //restance//, but it matters little since **no single word, out of context, can by itself ever translate another word perfectly**. The fact, in any case, that Mehlman and Weber found it necessary to add //restance// in brackets signals a difficulty in translation. That should have sufficed to avoid a careless reading or a trivial interpretation and to indicate the need for a certain labor of thought. Even in French, the neologism, //restance//, is designed to serve as a warning -- although one word alone can never suffice -- that work will be necessary in order to avoid equivalents such as 'permanence' or 'substance,' which are, by essence, 'presences.'" (p. 52)

[...]

"This iterability, which Sarl concedes, is indispensable to the functioning of all language, written or spoken (in the standard sense), and I would add, to that of every mark. Iterability supposes a minimal remainder (as well as a minimum of idealization) in order that the identity of the //selfsame// be repeatable and identifiable in, //through//, and even //in view of// its alteration. For the structure of iteration -- and this is another of its decisive traits -- implies //both// identity //and// difference. Iteration in its 'purest' form -- and it is always impure -- contains //in itself// the discrepancy of a difference that constitutes it as iteration. The iterability of an element divides its own identiy //a priori// even without taking into account the fact that **this identity can only //determine// or delimit itself through differential relations to other elements and that it hence bears the mark of this difference**. It is because thise iterability is differential, within each individual 'element' as well as between the 'elements,' because it splits each element while constituting it, because it marks it with an articulatory break, that the remainder, although indispensable, is never that of a full or fulfilling presence: it is a differential structure escaping the logic of presence or the (simple or dialectical) opposition of presence and absence, upon which opposition the idea of permanence depends. This is why the mark qua 'non-present remainder' is not the contrary of the mark of effacement.Like the trace it is, the mark is neither present nor absent. This is what is remarkable about it, even if it is not remarked." (p. 53)

Problems of reading, interpretation and representationalism:

"[... T]o assert, against this purported 'illusion,' that 'the sentences are precisely the realization of the intentions' is to employ a language that seems to me to stem from that good old representationalist and expressionist psychology (Sarl speaks, moreover, continually of 'representations,' and always designates language as a set of 'expressions'), for which the distinctions between 'intention' and 'realization,' 'intention' and 'expression' are still intact. They are intact both as purely conceptual (non-real) oppositions in the ideal case to which we shall return in a moment ('in serious literal speech'), in which utterances 'are precisely that realizations of intentions, and as simply real oppositions in the other cases, or at least in almost all other cases.' Just such a psychology (disarmingly enough today, I must confess) seems to me to permeate this short, rather improvised description of the process of writing: 'Often [?], especially [?] in writing, one forms one's intentions (or meanings) in the process of forming the sentences ...' Even if it were not simplistic, empiricist, and vague, this kind of descriptive psychology could not teach us anything about the object in which we are interested precisely because it is a psychology whereas that object is not essentially psychological. Unless, that is, Sarl considers it to be psychological, or deems the theory of those objects designated as speech acts to be a psychology, an interior domain of psychic life. In this case, however, the illusion that Sarl denounces would be explicitly Sarl's own." (p. 66-7)

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‘The event cannot be reduced to the fact that something happens. It may rain tonight, it may not rain. This will not be an absolute event, because I know what rain is’ (EoT, 13). The meaning of an event, in other words, must be allowed to exceed our //knowledge// of it, based on our acceptance of the opposition of the actual and the artificial.' (in the Derrida Dictionary, page 4, entry on 'artifactuality')

From entry on "Event" in the Derrida Dictionary:

"[...] event-ness – the significance of an event – is always artifactual; it is always something that is made, which is not to say it is always ‘made up’ in the sense of being opposed to whatever is regarded as actual or to what counts as a fact. Defined from within the metaphysics of presence, however, events always appear as things in themselves, and not as things that have been made or produced. According to the metaphysical concept of event, every event happens outside of the text, outside of representation. In practice, though, certain normalizing procedures – of language, politics, the media, etc. – produce certain occurrences as events, and overlook the event-ness of others. Outside a certain spectral community of those for whom music is vital to their sense of being in the world, and not simply a commodity, it would seem to be drawing a long bow to claim any world-historical significance for what happened at the Dylan concert in the Manchester Free Trade Hall on 17 May 1966. To claim what happened there and then as an event, let alone to claim that it is happening still, would be precisely to be seen as claiming something, to be making a case, to be producing what happened on that night in Manchester (which is happening still) as something deserving of world-historical attention and worthy of entry into the historical record. In a word, Manchester, 17 May 1966, is not Manhattan, 11 September 2001.

"True, but what is the event of Manhattan, 11 September 2001? What is 9/11? Now of course there are many claims (and counter-claims) concerning the event-ness of 9/11; we don’t need to list them here. The point is that 9/11 is not self-evidently any more world-historical than Dylan’s concert in Manchester in 1966, or indeed any other event; but certainly it has been made to seem so." (p. 33-4)

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Karin's comment, helping to work through the challenge of non-literate speech and one who is physically incapable of an act of writing: The process of knowing //is// practical. What that practice is can vary. Writing is not the idealized form of this practice, but an instantiation thereof. [? - waiting on feedback on this statement of my translation, so no quotes around this]